People - Consult Hyperion

New approaches to National ID

8th February 2011by Consult Hyperion1 Comment

The UK’s last attempt to introduce a national identity infrastructure, the national ID card, failed pretty badly and left everyone involved under a cloud (except for the management consultancies who billed tens of millions of pounds to the project).

The Home Office slipped out the final report of the Independent Scheme Advisory Panel (ISAP) this week, more than a year after it was written. The ostensibly independent report, which reveals how the ID system had been compromised by poor design and management, was submitted to the Home Office in December 2009.
[From Henry Porter – Home Office suppressed embarrassing ID cards report]

The report says that there are no specifications for usage or verification (which we knew – this was one of my constant complaints at the time) and, revealingly, that (in section 3.3) that “it is likely that European travel” will emerge as the key consumer benefit. This, I think, is an interesting comment. As I have pointed before in tedious detail, what the Identity & Passport Service (IPS) built was, well, a passport. It had no other functionality and, given the heritage, was never going to have. Hence my idea of renaming it “Passport Plus” and selling it to frequent travellers (eg, me) as a convenience.

As an aside, the report also says (in section 5.5) the “significant” number of change requests after the contracts had been awarded would likely increase risk, cost and timescale. Again, while this is a predictable comment, it is a reflection on the outdated consultation, specification and procurement processes used. Instead of a flagship government project heralding a new economy, we ended up with the usual fare: incomplete specifications, huge management consultant bills, massive and inflexible supply contracts.

The report repeated the same warnings ISAP had given the Home Office every year since the system blueprint was published in December 2006 by Liam Byrne and Joan Ryan, then Home Office Ministers, and James Hall, then head of the Identity and Passport Service (IPS).
[From Home Office suppressed embarrassing ID cards report – 1/7/2011 – Computer Weekly]

How did it all go do wrong? Liam Byrne should have known something about IT as he used to work for Accenture, as did James Hall (Joan Ryan was a sociology teacher who later became famous for having claimed for more than £1,000,000 in MP’s expenses). Yet somehow the “vision” that emerged was profoundly untechnological, backward-looking and lacking in inspiration. What’s different now?

Well, a key change is that the new administration is heading more along the lines of the US (with USTIC) and the Nordics, where people use their bank IDs to access public services. We’re working on a project with Visa Europe and our good friend Fred Piper at Royal Holloway to develop a pilot implementation right now.

Consult Hyperion, working with Visa Europe and Codes & Ciphers, is the industry lead for a Technology Strategy Board funded research project; Sure Identity, for Secure Authentication of Online Government Services. This innovative pilot scheme will investigate the security and cost benefits of consumers using new bank-issued electronic Visa debit cards to securely access online government services
[From Digital Systems – DS KTN Member receives funding from Trusted Services Competition for research into the secure authentication of online Government Services – Articles – Technology Strategy Board]

It’s possible to at least imagine some form of “UKTIC” that is interoperable with the US version, certainly to the extent that an American with a US bank account might be able to open a UK bank account, things like that. And it’s possible to imagine a kind of EUTIC that sets certain minimums in place so that UKTIC can interoperate with France TIC and Germany TIC and so on. I already have one or two ideas about where UKTIC may differ from USTIC. Let’s go back to the EFF’s comments on USTIC.

A National Academies study, Who Goes There?: Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy, warned that multiple, separate, unlinkable credentials are better for both security and privacy. Yet the draft NSTIC doesn’t discuss in any depth how to prevent or minimize linkage of our online IDs, which would seem much easier online than offline, and fails to discuss or refer to academic work on unlinkable credentials (such as that of Stefan Brands, or Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya).
[From Real ID Online? New Federal Online Identity Plan Raises Privacy and Free Speech Concerns | Electronic Frontier Foundation]

If we were to make UKTIC something like USTIC but with the addition of a class of unlinkable credentials that might be mandated for certain uses, then we could take a really important step forward: instead of a physical national identity card, the administration could trumpet and virtual national privacy card. (Actually, I’d be tempted call it a Big Society Card in order to get funding!)

These are personal opinions and should not be misunderstood as representing the opinions of
Consult Hyperion or any of its clients or suppliers

Positive changes in e-money regulation

8th February 2011by Consult HyperionLeave a comment

William Long and Kai Zhang, from our friends at Sidley & Austin, present a typically good summary of the main issues raised in the consultations preceding the implementation of the new E-Money Directive (EMD) in the UK in the recent issue of E-Finance & Payments Law & Policy (December 2010).

Generally speaking, things look very positive. The capital requirements are being relaxed so that anyone who wants to provide e-money services probably can do with too much trouble, so I predict that you’ll see some major companies moving in now. The prime candidates to offer services are probably telecommunications operators and retailers, but transit operators, event managers, corporate “campus” suppliers and others will surely seize the opportunity. Some have already declared their intentions.

O2 will apply for an e-money licence this year, signalling its commitment to support contactless payments in the UK in the near future.
[From O2 to apply for e-money licence to support NFC payments – 2/2/2011 – Computer Weekly]

The French operators announced a similar move this week. I can’t resist noting that this is precisely the strategy that we recommended to mobile operators a couple of years ago (that is, use the upcoming PSD/ELMI changes to start their own payment businesses). Competition is good for innovation, and bringing these new players into the payments business will be very positive for all of us.

The interest of mobile operators is natural, and they have to move quickly to avoid being cut out of the loop by handset-based secure element providers (eg, Apple) who may move quicker than the UICC-based secure element providers (eg, mobile operators). The interest of the transit operators is also natural, since they have the cards out there in peoples’ pockets. I still think that we’ve yet to see the really big plays yet: these will come from the retailers, just as they are in the US.

Kmart has begun testing check cashing, money transfers and prepaid cards in stores in Illinois, California and Puerto Rico, with plans to roll out the services nationally later this year. Best Buy has installed kiosks in its stores for shoppers to pay utility, cable and phone bills. Wal-Mart has opened roughly 1,500 MoneyCenters that process as many as 5 million transactions each week.
[From Retailers offer financial services to ‘unbanked’]

The use of retailer-issued e-money pre-paid products as a low-cost alternative to bank accounts for the excluded is a win-win. It takes unprofitable customers away from the banks and gives those customers more convenient services. And the retailers could steer customers to use these products at POS, thus saving on their payment processing costs. Personally, I think the prepaid market is not competitive enough (the charges are still too high) but new entrants enabled by the ELMI, new entrants with economies of scale (such as high street retailers), could open up the market and drive down costs very quickly.

Finally, I was also very excited to note in the article that the Treasury is considering my idea of making the balance limit for simplified due diligence (under the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive) for low-value electronic money “accounts” the same as the value of the largest banknote: in this case, €500. Although they are only looking at this for non-reloadable devices, I think this should be the guiding principle for reloadable devices as well. The link between the two, the “magic number”, is entirely symbolic: it doesn’t mean anything at all, but it’s a good way to focus debate and discussion about the regulatory balance between cash and cash alternatives.

These are personal opinions and should not be misunderstood as representing the opinions of
Consult Hyperion or any of its clients or suppliers

Having another go

8th February 2011by Consult Hyperion3 Comments

The UK’s last attempt to introduce a national identity infrastructure, the national ID card, failed pretty badly and left everyone involved under a cloud (except for the management consultancies who billed tens of millions of pounds to the project).

The Home Office slipped out the final report of the Independent Scheme Advisory Panel (ISAP) this week, more than a year after it was written. The ostensibly independent report, which reveals how the ID system had been compromised by poor design and management, was submitted to the Home Office in December 2009.
[From Henry Porter – Home Office suppressed embarrassing ID cards report]

The report says that there are no specifications for usage or verification (which we knew – this was one of my constant complaints at the time) and, revealingly, that (in section 3.3) that “it is likely that European travel” will emerge as the key consumer benefit. This, I think, is an interesting comment. As I have pointed before in tedious detail, what the Identity & Passport Service (IPS) built was, well, a passport. It had no other functionality and, given the heritage, was never going to have. Hence my idea of renaming it “Passport Plus” and selling it to frequent travellers (eg, me) as a convenience.

As an aside, the report also says (in section 5.5) the “significant” number of change requests after the contracts had been awarded would likely increase risk, cost and timescale. Again, while this is a predictable comment, it is a reflection on the outdated consultation, specification and procurement processes used. Instead of a flagship government project heralding a new economy, we ended up with the usual fare: incomplete specifications, huge management consultant bills, massive and inflexible supply contracts.

The report repeated the same warnings ISAP had given the Home Office every year since the system blueprint was published in December 2006 by Liam Byrne and Joan Ryan, then Home Office Ministers, and James Hall, then head of the Identity and Passport Service (IPS).
[From Home Office suppressed embarrassing ID cards report – 1/7/2011 – Computer Weekly]

How did it all go do wrong? Liam Byrne should have known something about IT as he used to work for Accenture, as did James Hall (Joan Ryan was a sociology teacher who later became famous for having claimed for more than £1,000,000 in MP’s expenses). Yet somehow the “vision” that emerged was profoundly untechnological, backward-looking and lacking in inspiration. What’s different now?

Well, a key change is that the new administration is heading more along the lines of the US (with USTIC) and the Nordics, where people use their bank IDs to access public services. We’re working on a project with Visa Europe and our good friend Fred Piper at Royal Holloway to develop a pilot implementation right now.

Consult Hyperion, working with Visa Europe and Codes & Ciphers, is the industry lead for a Technology Strategy Board funded research project; Sure Identity, for Secure Authentication of Online Government Services. This innovative pilot scheme will investigate the security and cost benefits of consumers using new bank-issued electronic Visa debit cards to securely access online government services
[From Digital Systems – DS KTN Member receives funding from Trusted Services Competition for research into the secure authentication of online Government Services – Articles – Technology Strategy Board]

It’s possible to at least imagine some form of “UKTIC” that is interoperable with the US version, certainly to the extent that an American with a US bank account might be able to open a UK bank account, things like that. And it’s possible to imagine a kind of EUTIC that sets certain minimums in place so that UKTIC can interoperate with France TIC and Germany TIC and so on. I already have one or two ideas about where UKTIC may differ from USTIC. Let’s go back to the EFF’s comments on USTIC.

A National Academies study, Who Goes There?: Authentication Through the Lens of Privacy, warned that multiple, separate, unlinkable credentials are better for both security and privacy. Yet the draft NSTIC doesn’t discuss in any depth how to prevent or minimize linkage of our online IDs, which would seem much easier online than offline, and fails to discuss or refer to academic work on unlinkable credentials (such as that of Stefan Brands, or Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya).
[From Real ID Online? New Federal Online Identity Plan Raises Privacy and Free Speech Concerns | Electronic Frontier Foundation]

If we were to make UKTIC something like USTIC but with the addition of a class of unlinkable credentials that might be mandated for certain uses, then we could take a really important step forward: instead of a physical national identity card, the administration could trumpet and virtual national privacy card. (Actually, I’d be tempted call it a Big Society Card in order to get funding!)

The magic number

8th February 2011by Consult Hyperion3 Comments

William Long and Kai Zhang, from our friends at Sidley & Austin, present a typically good summary of the main issues raised in the consultations preceding the implementation of the new E-Money Directive (EMD) in the UK in the recent issue of E-Finance & Payments Law & Policy (December 2010).

Generally speaking, things look very positive. The capital requirements are being relaxed so that anyone who wants to provide e-money services probably can do with too much trouble, so I predict that you’ll see some major companies moving in now. The prime candidates to offer services are probably telecommunications operators and retailers, but transit operators, event managers, corporate “campus” suppliers and others will surely seize the opportunity. Some have already declared their intentions.

O2 will apply for an e-money licence this year, signalling its commitment to support contactless payments in the UK in the near future.
[From O2 to apply for e-money licence to support NFC payments – 2/2/2011 – Computer Weekly]

The French operators announced a similar move this week. I can’t resist noting that this is precisely the strategy that we recommended to mobile operators a couple of years ago (that is, use the upcoming PSD/ELMI changes to start their own payment businesses). Competition is good for innovation, and bringing these new players into the payments business will be very positive for all of us.

The interest of mobile operators is natural, and they have to move quickly to avoid being cut out of the loop by handset-based secure element providers (eg, Apple) who may move quicker than the UICC-based secure element providers (eg, mobile operators). The interest of the transit operators is also natural, since they have the cards out there in peoples’ pockets. I still think that we’ve yet to see the really big plays yet: these will come from the retailers, just as they are in the US.

Kmart has begun testing check cashing, money transfers and prepaid cards in stores in Illinois, California and Puerto Rico, with plans to roll out the services nationally later this year. Best Buy has installed kiosks in its stores for shoppers to pay utility, cable and phone bills. Wal-Mart has opened roughly 1,500 MoneyCenters that process as many as 5 million transactions each week.
[From Retailers offer financial services to ‘unbanked’]

The use of retailer-issued e-money pre-paid products as a low-cost alternative to bank accounts for the excluded is a win-win. It takes unprofitable customers away from the banks and gives those customers more convenient services. And the retailers could steer customers to use these products at POS, thus saving on their payment processing costs. Personally, I think the prepaid market is not competitive enough (the charges are still too high) but new entrants enabled by the ELMI, new entrants with economies of scale (such as high street retailers), could open up the market and drive down costs very quickly.

Finally, I was also very excited to note in the article that the Treasury is considering my idea of making the balance limit for simplified due diligence (under the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive) for low-value electronic money “accounts” the same as the value of the largest banknote: in this case, €500. Although they are only looking at this for non-reloadable devices, I think this should be the guiding principle for reloadable devices as well. The link between the two, the “magic number”, is entirely symbolic: it doesn’t mean anything at all, but it’s a good focus for debate.

These opinions are my own (I think) and presented solely in my capacity as an interested member of the general public [posted with ecto]

And I’ve got my bronze swimming certificate

1st February 2011by Consult Hyperion3 Comments

When I’m talking about identity, I sometimes joke that our ill-thought out perspectives on the topic have led to the bizarre situation that in the UK it is much easier to get a job with a bank than an account. In The Daily Telegraph for 29th January 2011, I read under the headline “False CV Fooled Bank” that:

A fraudster used a false CV [claiming degrees from Oxford and Harvard] to gain a £165,000 per annum job at a City investment bank.

I assumed that everybody made up stuff on their resumes, but it turns out that it’s against the law, so the culprit, Mr. Peter Gwinnell, was prosecuted and given a suspended sentence (I assume he’ll skip over this on his next CV). We keep being told that employers use Facebook profiles nowdays (I hope they use mine: it says that I am the most intelligent person alive today and that Nelson Mandela queued for my autograph) so perhaps CVs will soon be a thing of the past. Just out of curiosity I googled Mr. Gwinnell and found that as well as his empty LinkedIn profile, the bald fact of his departure is there on the web.

PETER GWINNELL Appointment terminated as director on 15 Feb 2010 (Document)
[From AHLI UNITED BANK (UK) PLC of W1H 6LR in LONDON UNITED KINGDOM]

To be honest, if an employer wanted proof of my A-Level in Mathematics or O-Level in British Constitution or the Degree I scraped through with in 1980, I’d be hard pressed to provide it. I don’t have the faintest idea where the relevant certificates are. I suppose I could ring the University and ask them to send me a letter, but how would the employer know I hadn’t forged the letter. And how would Southampton University know that it is me calling? Or, for that matter, how would they know that I hadn’t forged the O-Level in British Constitution certificate?

When I started my first job after university, I don’t remember being asked to provide any such proof. Come to that, I don’t remember being asked to prove who I was either. In those days, all you needed was a national insurance number. But if employers are going want proof, like the actual certificates, then there will be a bit of a premium on the certificates. Once the certificates are worth something, they will be stolen. This is what happens in China.

Local officials said the files were lost when state workers moved them from the first to the second floor of a government building. But the graduates say they believe officials stole the files and sold them to underachievers seeking new identities and better job prospects — a claim bolstered by a string of similar cases across China.
[From Files Vanished, Young Chinese Lose the Future – NYTimes.com]

How are we going to deal with this digitally? It shouldn’t be that complicated for Harvard to create a digital certificate to attest to the fact that the owner of a particular identity did, in fact, graduate. If there were some sort of device or token, perhaps some form of card, that contained my educational identity (ie, key pair) then Harvard could simply sign the public key with their private key and the whole problem is fixed (glossing over, of course, where this device or token might come from, and so on).

Something does have to be done though. The current system is simply a joke. It’s quite funny when someone cons a bank into giving them a senior position despite knowing nothing about banking (imagine!) but one of the areas that really bothers me, and probably should bother you too, is the ease with which medical credentials are forged.

A conman from Lancashire who posed as a vet and nearly killed a pony by botching its castration has been jailed for two years. Russell Oakes also masqueraded as a doctor, carried out an intimate examination and charged for false diagnoses, Liverpool Crown Court heard. The 43-year-old, of Hesketh Bank, admitted 41 charges of fraud, forgery and perverting the course of justice.
[From BBC News – Bogus Lancashire vet jailed after botched castration]

How did he do this? Was he a master forger, capable of producing an authentic-looking medical school diploma using specially-aged paper, his engraving skills and authentic ink procured from the correct German manufacturer? No, of course not: this is a post-modern crime.

He bought a fake university certificate off the internet, the court heard.
[From BBC News – Bogus Lancashire vet jailed after botched castration]

Now imagine an alternative infrastructure. I am asked to prove that I have a degree from Southampton University. I log on to the university using my OpenID id.dave.com and answer some questions, provide some data, to satisfy the university that I am, indeed, the relevant dave. My OpenID profile includes a public key, so the university creates a public key certificates, signing that key and some standard data that they provide. I can now give this certificate to anyone, and they can check it by verifying the signature using the published Southampton University public key, resolving the certificate chain in the usual way.

the BBC suffered another embarrassment today after a man interviewed on Radio 4’s World at One who claimed to be a Liberal Democrat MP was revealed to be an imposter.
[From Radio 4 follows Jeremy Hunt gaffe by interviewing fake MP | Media | guardian.co.uk]

How would the proposed infrastructure help here? The system has to be so easy to use that a harassed BBC researcher can use it. Come to that it has to be so easy that military installations, the police and other can use it too.

During the period of January to June 2010, undercover investigators utilized fraudulent badges and credentials of the DoD’s military criminal investigative organizations to penetrate the security at: 6 military installations; 2 federal courthouses; and 3 state buildings in the New York and New Jersey area
[From Schneier on Security: The Security Threat of Forged Law-Enforcement Credentials]

Step forward the mobile phone. Every single one of the people who were “verifying” IDs in these stories has a mobile phone, so there’s no need to look any further. The military policeman’s mobile phone should be able to check your ID. And your mobile phone should be able to check his ID. And if you’re both using mobile phones, both IDs can be checked simultaneously. We already know that symmetry is an important property of an identity infrastructure: the bank needs to be able to check it’s me, but I need to be able check it’s the bank. And the mobile phone can do both. So next time Peter shows up for an interview, the interviewer can simply tap Peter’s NFC phone against their NFC phone and see a full list of his credentials.

(Law enforcement has special additional issue though: sometimes, the policeman doesn’t want to reveal that he’s a policeman, but that’s a topic for another day.)

Cryptography can bring novel solutions

3rd January 2011by Consult Hyperion2 Comments

In some of the workshops that I've been running, I've mentioned that I think that transparency will be one of the key elements of new propositions in the world of electronic transactions and that clients looking to develop new businesses in that space might want to consider the opportunities for sustained advantage. Why not let me look inside my bank and see where my money is, so to speak? If I log in to my credit card issuer I can see that I spent £43 on books at Amazon: if I log in to Amazon I can that I spent £43 but I can also see what books I bought, recommendations, reviews and so on. They have the data, so they let me look at it. If I want to buy a carpet from a carpet company, how do I know whether they will go bankrupt or not before they deliver? Can I have a look at their order book?
Transparency increases confidence and trust. I often use a story from the August 1931 edition of Popular Mechanics to illustrate this point. The article concerns the relationship between transparency and behaviour in the specific case of depression-era extra-judicial unlicensed wealth redistribution…

BANK hold-ups may soon become things of the past if the common-sense but revolutionary ideas of Francis Keally, New York architect, are put into effect. He suggests that banks be constructed with glass walls and that office partitions within the building likewise be transparent, so that a clear view of everything that is happening inside the bank will be afforded from all angles at all times.

[From Glass Banks Will Foil Hold-Ups]

I urge you to clink on the link, by the way, to see the lovely drawing that goes with the article. The point is well made though: you can't rob a glass bank. No walls, no Bernie Madoff. But you can see the problem: some of the information in the bank is confidential: my personal details, for example. Thus, it would be great if I could look through the list of bank deposits to check that the bank really has the money it says it has, but I shouldn't be able to see who those depositors are (although I will want third-party verification that they exist!).

Why am I talking about this? Well, I read recently that Bank of America has called in management consultants to help them manage the fallout from an as-yet-nonexistent leak of corporate secrets, although why these secrets be prove embarrassing is not clear. In fact, no-one knows whether the leak will happen, or whether it will impact BofA, although Wikileaks' Julian Assange had previously mentioned having a BofA hard disk in his possession, so the market drew its own conclusions.

Bank of America shares fell 3 percent in trading the day after Mr. Assange made his threat against a nameless bank

[From Facing WikiLeaks Threat, Bank of America Plays Defense – NYTimes.com]

Serious money. Anyway, I'm interested in what this means for the future rather than what it means now: irrespective of what Bank of America's secrets actually are because

when WikiLeaks, a whistle-blowing website, promised to publish five gigabytes of files from an unnamed financial institution early next year, bankers everywhere started quaking in their hand-made shoes. And businesses were struck by an alarming thought: even if this threat proves empty, commercial secrets are no longer safe.

[From Business and WikiLeaks: Be afraid | The Economist]

Does technology provide any comfort here at all? I think it does. Many years ago, I had the pleasant experience of having dinner with Nicholas Negroponte, John Barlow and Eric Hughes, author of the cypherpunk manifesto, at a seminar in Palm Springs. This was in, I think, 1995. I can remember Eric talking about "encrypted open books", a topic that now seems fantastically prescient. His idea was to develop cryptographic techniques so that you could perform certain kinds of operations on encrypted data: in other words, you could build glass organisations where anyone could run some software to check your books without actually being able to read your books. Nick Szabo later referred back to the same concepts when talking about the specific issue of auditing.

Knowing that mutually confidential auditing can be accomplished in principle may lead us to practical solutions. Eric Hughes' "encrypted open books" was one attempt.

[From Szabo]

Things like this seem impossible when you think of books in terms of paper and index cards: how can you show me your books without giving away commercial data? But when we think in terms of bits, and cryptography, and "blinding" it is all perfectly sensible. This technology seems to me to open up a new model, where corporate data is encrypted but open to all so that no-one cares whether it is copied or distributed in any way. Instead of individuals being given the keys to the database, they will be given keys to decrypt only the data that they are allowed to see and since these keys can easily be stored in tamper-resistant hardware (whereas databases can't) the implementation becomes cost-effective. While I was thinking about this, Bob Hettinga reminded me about Peter Wayner's "translucent databases", that build on the Eric's concepts.

Wayner really does end up where a lot of us think databases will be someday, particularly in finance: repositories of data accessible only by digital bearer tokens using various blind signature protocols… and, oddly enough, not because someone or other wants to strike a blow against the empire, but simply because it's safer — and cheaper — to do that way.

[From Book Review: Peter Wayner's "Translucent Databases"]

There are other kinds of corporate data that it may at first seem need to be secret, but on reflection could be translucent (I'll switch to Peter's word here because it's a much better description of practical implementations). An example might be salaries. Have the payroll encrypted but open, so anyone can access a company's salary data and see what salaries are earned. Publish the key to decrypt the salaries, but not any other data. Now anyone who needs access to salary data (eg, the taxman, pressure groups, potential employees, customers etc) can see it and the relevant company data is transparent to them. One particular category of people who might need access to this data is staff! So, let's say I'm working on a particular project and need access to our salary data because I need to work out the costs of a proposed new business unit. All I need to know is the distribution of salaries: I don't need to know who they belong to. If our payroll data is open, I can get on and use it without having to have CDs of personal data sent through the post, of whatever.

I can see that for many organisations this kind of controlled transparency (ie, translucency) will be a competitive advantage: as an investor, as customer, as a citizen, I would trust these organsations far more than "closed" ones. Why wait for quarterly filings to see how a public company is doing when you could go on the web at any time to see their sales ledger? Why rely on management assurances of cost control when you can see how their purchase ledger is looking (without necessarily seeing what they're buying or who they are buying it from) when you can see it on their web page? Why not check staffing levels and qualifications by accessing the personnel database? Is this any crazier than Blippy?

These are personal opinions and should not be misunderstood as representing the opinions of
Consult Hyperion or any of its clients or suppliers

In your Facebook

20th December 2010by Consult Hyperion2 Comments

Facebook itself has been playing with this kind of thing – personal location – for a while. We’re all familiar with the various “check in” services, but the internet of things is something much more.

All attendees of the f8 developer conference are receiving special RFID tags that enable them to check-in to various locations throughout the conference venue. The service lets you tag yourself in photos, become a fan of various Facebook Pages, and share activity to your Facebook profile. While it’s still a concept service, it’s interesting to see some of the things that Facebook developers are currently testing
[From Facebook Tests Location Through RFID AT f8]

Is this just the same as messing about with FourSquare or Facebook Places? I think not. Bernhard Warner, editor of Social Media Influencer puts it very nicely.

Location-based services take either a lot of time — you have to manually check in everywhere you go — or take a lot of liberties — you open up your personal information to businesses.

If RFID checks you in and out automatically, then the web will certainly “take a lot of liberties” (although this may well be what people want). But this is just about the location of people. What will happen when the location of things becomes part of the natural order?

I happened to be chairing a panel at IIR’s M2M Business Exchange event in London recently, and I have to say that I was surprised by the range of organisations that came along. I’d assumed that it would be mainly hardware guys and telcos, but the sessions that they had on smart metering, remote healthcare, retail and so forth were actually discussing some quite diverse applications. Naturally, I was on the lookout for things that might make a business for our customers, so I was focused on the applications that demand more security, such as payments.

ETSI, the telecoms standards body, has been working on what they call SES, which stands for “Service Enablement Services” to form a standard layer between the internet of things and the value-added services to sit above them. Joachim Koss, the TC M2M Vice Chairman said that the standard would include security “tools”, which obviously I would like to see as including fully-functional digital money and digital identity elements because this connects to my somewhat simplistic definition: smart pipe = dumb pipe + digital identity + digital money.

I think this is the right approach, provided that the SES layer contains rich enough services to provide for a proper spectrum of identity types (that is, it does not require the full disclosure of “real identity” or allow uncontrolled anonymity). Another advantage that I can see is that if mobile operators were to get their act together, they might be able to use the SES in combination with a secure token (in the UICC) to make a business from it: for example, I might want to choose an option on my phone which means that my location is visible to anyone on LinkedIn provided they work for Consult Hyperion, and then temporarily extend this to a client for a month in connection with a project, but allow my wife to see it via Facebook at all times, that sort of thing. It would be another example of a value-added service that could, when built in to the infrastructure of other more sophisticated value-added services, generate much more income than raw data.

These opinions are my own (I think) and presented solely in my capacity as an interested member of the general public [posted with ecto]

Stux on you

29th November 2010by Consult Hyperion2 Comments

[Dave Birch] The media are full of cyberwar at the moment. I’m sleeping safely in my bed knowing that we now have a cyberwar strategy. But there does appear to have been one cyberwar attack that has already succeeded. The story about Stuxnet is fascinating, especially now that the Iranians have admitted that it worked.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad admitted Monday that “several” uranium enrichment centrifuges were damaged by “software installed in electronic equipment,” amid speculation Iran’s nuclear activities had come under cyberattack.
[From France24 – Iran admits uranium enrichment hit by malware]

So whoever wanted to stop the Iranians from enriching uranium (the Americans, the Saudis, the Israelis etc) found a cheaper and more efficient way to do it than launching cruise missiles or dropping bunker busting bombs.

Continue reading “Stux on you”

Russian regulation

13th November 2010by Consult HyperionLeave a comment

[Dave Birch] As many people have noted, the Russia e-payments landscape is really

According to Victor Dostov

There are 25 million active “e-purses” (web wallets containing pre-paid value) and the market is growing at 20%.

The market is now going to be shaped by regulation. It’s a difficult problem for regulators, to take a rapidly growing market and add prudent regulation without disrupting

The government has approved a bill to regulate e-payments, a market that is growing at 40% per annum.

Viktor Dostov, the chairman of the Russian E-Money Association, says that the bill is a reasonable compromise, requiring operators such as WebMoney and Yandex.Dengi to obtain a Central Bank licence for “non-banking credit organisations”. The law requires such organisations to have a minimum equity of 18m roubles ($600,000), which may be a little high for innovative startups.

It is very tempting for regulators to demand rigorous identification Here’s an example. The current “Draft law on the National Payment System” has the concept of “proportionate identification” which is important.. The law also contains a sensible balance on KYC, so no identification is needed for payment accounts with a maximum balance of 15,000 roubles.

Under current framework, there is no equivalent of the European “Payment Institution” or “Electronic Money Institution”. One of the key aspects of European regulation is that it has allowed non-banks to bring innovation to the sector

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Yota, Russia’s leading 4G networks operator (offering WiMax, battling for LTE frequencies and thinking about brand-name handset), launched a partnership with Mobi. Dengi (a mobile money transfer scheme working closely with Beeline, a Russian MNO) and Tavrichesky Bank – to allow its subscribers to use the money they have topped up to their prepaid account – to pay for other services like utility bills, TV, mobile top-up.
[From Retail Banking in Russia: Innovation Unfolded: Each decent Internet service provider strives to create its own payments wallet]

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Continue reading “Russian regulation”

Front end

12th November 2010by Consult Hyperion1 Comment

[Dave Birch] We’ve often looked at the natural strategy of using identity infrastructure as the “front end” to payment infrastructure. To put it simply, if you have an id card in your pocket (or, more likely, your phone) wherever you go, then what’s the point of carrying other cards around? Well, one reason is that if you only have one ring to rule them all, and that ring is lost, you’re in schtuck (I think there’s an idea for a book there somewhere). This is a valid concern.

A junior, who wishes to remain anonymous to protect her identity, had her ID card number stolen.
[From Identification card theft becomes a documented issue on campus – News]

Now, of course, in a developed nation (such as Germany, for example) this shouldn’t matter, since there is nothing remotely secret about ID card numbers and they cannot be used to effect any transactions — you need the smart ID card for that. But when the ID number is attached to something that has no inherent security, like a piece of cardboard, then it can be the root of mischief.

A week later, she decided to check her account balance at the Help Desk. The help desk printed her receipts, and she realized her laundry money account had decreased from $21 to $2.

“I saw a lot of Marvin’s, but I hadn’t ordered from Marvin’s at all this year,” the student said.

“I looked at the transactions to compare them,” she said. “When I was in Chicago, my card was being used here, and once of my receipts said that I had charged for Marvin’s at 6:46 p.m., when I had also bought food at the Hub at 6:48 p.m.”
[From Identification card theft becomes a documented issue on campus – News]

This is the inevitable consequence of 1-factor authentication, just like magnetic stripes on credit cards. Fortunately, the story has a modern, happy ending.

Public Safety, who traced the Marvin’s orders to a cell phone number, caught the perpetrator.
[From Identification card theft becomes a documented issue on campus – News]

Too funny: the master criminal who copied the ID card number down used his own mobile phone to order food using the number. Still, it’s a serious point, and it has been discussed with relation to some of the national smart ID schemes that we have advised on: there’s a reasonable concern that ID cards might be a target for crime if they can be used for payments, which is true, if the ID cards have no security. But suppose the ID cards have not only a chip on to prevent counterfeiting, but also a biometric cardholder verification method.

The much talked about Unique Identity Project (UID) is not just about providing citizens with biometric cards. In fact, the new identity cards can be used for multiple purposes and can even replace the debit or credit cards one day.
[From UID cards can replace bank cards – CIOL News Reports]

So, once again, let’s be clear about these implications. An effective digital identity infrastructure sitting on top of a standardised “payments cloud” will completely reshape the sector. It will substantially reduce the cost and complexity of starting a new payment scheme, and will further substantially reduce the cost and complexity of running a new payment scheme.

Continue reading “Front end”