the average interchange cost for a small retailer on a $50 face-to-face purchase processed on a PIN-debit card with a major electronic funds transfer network logo in 1996 was 9.9 cents. By 2007, that same sale generated 40.1 cents in interchange… In contrast to PIN-debit pricing, signature-debit interchange has been stable since 2005… a small retailer in a $50 card-present sale with a Visa check card would pay interchange of 66.5 cents, and 67.5 cents on an equivalent MasterCard Debit transaction.[From News]
Now, I reckon that the same retailer in the UK would pay 10p for a transaction that they pay 40 cents (30p) for in the US. So, I’m missing something here. Why does a debit transaction cost a merchant so much more in the US? For $50 transactions, setting the cost at 15 cents or 30 cents is not a make-or-break decision. But, obviously, for many merchants (especially in the cash-replacement potential market sector that I am interested in) the average sale is much smaller and a 40 cent charge on a $4 transaction eats up a lot of the merchant’s margin.
The chain’s average ticket is $6, a level at which it’s difficult to make money after deducting interchange, Jones argues. Currently, credit cards account for about half of sales.[From News]
So unless I’m missing something else about the cost structure, the only interpretation of these figures is that merchants in the US simply pay a much higher fee than merchants in (for example) the UK do. Our friends at Payments News pointed me to a recent report that suggests that that is precisely the right interpretation.
U.S. swipe fees are: more than two times the rates in the UK and New Zealand, four times the rates in Australia, and over six times the cross border rates recently agreed upon by MasterCard and the EU[From Merchants Publish A Look at Interchange Fees Outside the US]
Why is this gap so big? Surely the US market is just as competitive as the UK market? I read a recent analysis from Peter Jones of Payment Systems Europe — who put the average merchant fee at 1.8% in the US and 0.8% in Europe — and he attributed the difference to the competitive issuing market in the US, with card companies competing to attract consumers by offering ever-higher rewards and charging the merchants for them. You can see why merchants object to this: but what should they do? James van Dyke of Javelin has some sage advice.
Merchants have some valid concerns about the payments industry, but they should push back on their advocacy-group partners and lobbyists on the viability of this interchange campaign. The interchange debate is fundamentally an issue between differing camps of business entities, and to position it as a consumer-advocacy issue will ultimately be fruitless for the merchant community in my opinion.[From Javelin Strategy and Research » The merchant cost-of-interchange debate: what are the facts?]
Yes, the cost of cards needs to come down. But the way to do this is by encouraging competition, not by whining to regulators.
A key reason why is that there’s no way that regulators can calculate what the merchant fee should be. The Commission uses the “tourist” test as the benchmark. A tourist comes to a retailer they have never been to before and may never visit again. How much is it worth the retailer to accept a card rather than cash? This, according to the Commission, is the true value of the card payment. But they are wrong. As Peter Ayliffe, head of Visa Europe puts it,
We have already made it clear that, while we accept the merchant indifference test, we do not accept cash as the comparator for credit and therefore disagree with the Commission’s proposed rate on credit interchange.[From Visa Europe rejects claims from the European retailing community]
Using cash as the benchmark in this way does not correctly account for the social cost of cash, which is spread across consumers, merchants and governments. Should the regulator set the cost of cards at the cost of cash to the merchant, or the cost of cash to society (which is higher)? If the former, then they are subsidising the retail community at the expense of everyone else. If the latter, then the winners (everyone) are diffuse but the losers (retailers) are not, and political fall-out is inevitable.
Surely the right answer is to leave the fees to the marketplace but make it as easy as possible for competitors to enter the marketplace?
These opinions are my own (I think) and presented solely in my capacity as an interested member of the general public [posted with ecto]