Category: Consult Hyperion events and notices
Be there or be square: the 11th annual Digital Money Forum
They, and the delegates, will be discussing all of the major trends in the sector and what the next trends might be. Contactless payments, NFC in mobile phones, Internet payments, remittances, cash replacement and public policy, the often-forgotten needs of the disabled, the nature of innovation in payments. All of the speakers and all of the panellists have been invited because they have something interesting and worthwhile to contribute: you won’t find yourself sitting watching product marketing presentations, you’ll find yourself engaging and learning.
There will be a special “Meet the Bloggers” panel where you will be able to question in person some of people you turn to first on the net everyday for perspectives on the retail electronic payments sector; Chris Skinner from FinanSer (UK), Colin Henderson from Bankwatch (Canada), Scott Loftesness from Payments New (USA) and Aneace Haddad (Singapore).
The role of identity cards
I didn’t need to register, as I had apparently done so already, by creating something called a Government Gateway account when filing my tax return. I didn’t need to send them a photograph, as they still had my old one on file. I didn’t need to prove my address, as they had the electoral roll. I didn’t need to send them proof of identity, as they could look up my passport, just from the number. Seriously. Twenty minutes.
[From Shared Opinions | The Spectator]
He mentions this to support the idea that there’s no point being against a identity card because, in essence, we already have one. But this is wrong: this is an argument in favour of an effective national identity register (which I am in favour of too) not an argument in favour of an effective national identity card which, had it existed and been designed properly, would have been used to authenticate Mr. Rifkind in this transaction. His experience illustrates precisely why the government should focus on the issuing of national identity numbers and not on storing data — any data — in the register. Adding a national identity number to the DVLA database makes sense: adding the DVLA number to the register doesn’t deliver anything beyond what is already place and makes the system potentially more vulnerable. What should happen is this: Mr. Rifkind logs in to the government gateway — initially using usernames and passwords but using 2FA once the cards have been rolled out in the future — and from then on seamlessly moves around government departments and gets stuff done using standard federated identity products. No spending half an hour searching for the piece of paper that you haven’t seen since last year that has your government gateway log in details on it, as I did when sorting out my tax last month (unluckily just before the whole system crashed).
68 episode 3: Mabel’s Story
Dog years
According to one of the U.K. newspapers, the government is thinking about chipping prisoners in order to track them, as they (sort of) do at the moment with ankle bracelets…
But, instead of being contained in bracelets worn around the ankle, the tiny chips would be surgically inserted under the skin of offenders in the community, to help enforce home curfews. The radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, as long as two grains of rice, are able to carry scanable personal information about individuals, including their identities, address and offending record.
[From Prisoners ‘to be chipped like dogs’ – Independent Online Edition > UK Politics]
They are talking about Verichips here, but a moment’s reflection leads me to the conclusion that the story either cannot be true at all or can only have been leaked to the newspaper by someone who hasn’t the slightest understanding of RFID technology or, for that matter, technology in general. Verichips store only a 16-digit number and they are not re-writable: they can’t store addresses or anything else. But then none of the people in the article seem particularly au fait with the either the technology or its risks:
Consumer privacy expert Liz McIntyre said a colleague had already proved he could “clone” a chip. “He can bump into a chipped person and siphon the chip’s unique signal in a matter of seconds,” she said.
When she says “siphon the chip’s unique signal”, she of course means “read the chip ID as per the specification”. Reading the ID number off of the chip is no different to reading it off of the patients bracelet. It’s just a number. I’m not waving away perfectly valid privacy concerns here. I’m just pointing out that the fact of the matter is that there is no point implanting a chip under the skin of someone who doesn’t want to co-operate. They will simply take it out, or swap it with another chip. The technology has absolutely nothing to offer in this case.
Criminals in Reading are thicker than criminals elsewhere
I can’t believe banks are making fraud this easy. Without a PIN number there will be no identification verification process, therefore making it easy for the criminal to use. It will make our job in the town centre harder because there’s a strong probability that fraud will be increased.
Well, if contactless cards do cause an increase in fraud, the police will know where to look for the perps. Steve Wilmott, Head of the Economic Crime Unit for the City of London Police, says that one of the key trends in financial fraud is that a decade ago a tenth of fraud cases involved a bank insider whereas its’ now 40%.
Technorati Tags: contactless, fraud, payments
68 episode 2: Carly’s Story
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Season’s greetings
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Season’s Greetings
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Mike Hendry
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