Practical identity

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[Dave Birch] It’s all very well people like me going on about keys, certificates and zero-knowledge proofs but what are the problems that an identity infrastructure has to solve down at the coal face, so to speak. Here’s an example from a newspaper I happened to be reading (The Daily Telegraph “Money” section, 13th March 2010). I won’t repeat the entire story, which concerns an elderly, partially-disabled woman who had UKP500 stolen from her bank account at Santander. The bank discovered the fraud, to their credit, and asked the women to come to the branch so that they could sort things out. However, they demanded that she product either a valid passport, a valid driving licence with a picture on it or a birth certificate. She (along with countless other people) had none of these. Despite the fact that she had had an account with them for many, many years, the process derailed The charity Age Concern, quoted in the article, noted the expense of obtaining new passports for people who have no intention of travelling anywhere and also noted that elderly people are sometimes asked to produce utility bills (to get a mobile phone contract, say) that they do not have because they live in care homes or with relatives and that there is a further serious problem where they ask family members to deal with financial services, government and other organisations on their behalf. If you can’t prove who you are to the bank where you have had an account for decades, how on earth is your daughter supposed to deal with the bank on your behalf?

One practical suggestion might be for Age Concern to operate a service to provide fake passports to its members. It could do this at low cost, and since fake British passports do not have to be particularly high quality to suffice (the bank just photocopies them anyway), this could provide a simple and cost-effective means to help their members.

Dubai airport is not just a two bit arrival and departure lounge for a small Arab country. It is a veritable cross roads for global airline traffic – one of the 10 most important international hubs in the world. Yet its passport scanning machines failed to recognise that all 11 passports were not just fakes but quite awful fakes.

[From Snowblog – What the Dubai murder says about airport security]

I doubt the elderly lady’s local bank branch has “passport scanning machines” of any description, so my suggestion is entirely practical. On the other hand, if we decide to opt for legal solutions, what should we do? If we are going to have a shot at improving the identity infrastructure to the benefit of society, then it has to work in these cases, which are hardly rare or extreme. This simple, practical case should serve as a benchmark: how can an older person use whatever system is proposed in order to ring up a bank and get something done with their own money.

In this light, how does the banking industry manage identity in the future… Would you have predicted 15 years ago that we’d still be using IDs and Passwords today? Will we still be using them 15 years from now?

[From Predicting the Future of Identity | Future Banking Blog]

Actually fifteen years ago I did predict, more than once, that we wouldn’t be using passwords by now. I thought then, and I still think now, that passwords aren’t really security of any kind. Never mind elderly people trying to remember passwords on the phone, I can’t remember passwords on the phone. I was speaking one of my card providers recently, having called to query a declined transaction, and was genuinely shocked to be asked for my password. I had no memory of having set a password on this account at any time in the past, so had to go through the whole set-up all over again. (Which was pretty annoying, but not as annoying as being asked for my card number yet again, ten seconds after I had punched all sixteen digits into the keypad!!).

As I sat down to write the rest of this post, the combination of prosaic, archaic and potentially catastrophic palaver that is the process of opening an account in modern Britain was once again raising blood pressure in our household. Having got annoyed with the poor customer service from one of our credit card issuers, I cancelled the card (a card, incidentally, that I spend around £3,000 per month on, since I travel a lot for business) and appealed to the twitterverse for suggestions as to alternatives. A testament to my middle class status, the most popular suggestion was the John Lewis Partnership Card that delivers shopping vouchers for Waitrose and John Lewis, so I went off to their web site and immediately applied. Hurrah! It said something like “congratulations, you’re accepted”. My happiness was short lived, as it soon became apparent that they weren’t going to send me a card at all, but a form to fill out and sign. Whatever. When it turned up I signed it, my wife signed it and I sent it back, then went away on business.

My wife phoned me after a few days wondering where her new card was. When I got back, I discovered that my card had arrived but hers had not. So I gallantly gave her mine (one of the great advantages of PIN cards over signature or biometric cards), and started going through the rest of the backlog of mail. Eventually I came across a letter to me explaining that John Lewis could not send my wife her card without further proof of identity because of know-your-customer and anti-money laundering regulations. My wife has only lived in the UK since 1986 and has only had a Barclays account for 20 years, so you can see why they might be suspicious. She follows a pattern well-known to FATF investigators of international organised crime: live at the same address for the last 15 years, use your Barclaycard to buy food at the same Waitrose every week and work for Surrey County Council, presumably a known hot-bed for narco-terrorism.

In order to prove her identity, and therefore get her card, she had to (in hommage to the founding of the John Lewis partnership in 1929) post them her council tax bill and last month’s bank statement. International terrorists would find these completely impossible to forge <sarcasm=”on”> as they contain advanced anti-counterfeiting watermarks, holograms and embossing </sarcasm=”off”>. Of course, this being 2010, you might have thought that my wife would merely have to log in to John Lewis using her Barclays’ dongle and Barclays would federate her identity (which they must have already established to the satisfaction of financial regulators) but I’m afraid even these rudimentary steps toward an identity infrastructure have yet to be taken.

In summary: everyone’s time and money continues to be wasted and we are no closer to having an identity infrastructure for the 21st century than we were at the dawn of the web.

Dog’s life

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[Dave Birch] There was a news story in the UK recently about the very sad death of a young woman who was lured to a remote spot by a man who met her on Facebook. The man was pretending to be a teenage boy. Facebook became the focus of the story, with the usual calls for something to be done. So is the sky falling in because of social networking?

You could just as easily argue that criminals are easier to catch because of Facebook, or any other new technology. The police can use them too, can’t they? Doesn’t social networking make it easier for the police and others to work together? Couldn’t Twitter help detectives? Can’t detectives subscribe to RSS feeds on cases of interest? (Frankly, I doubt it, but you get my point.)

[From 15Mb: yet another blog from Dave Birch » Blog Archive » The “Ford Mondeo Killer”]

People might think they’re anonymous, but they’re not. A rational policy on law and order would surely try to get more criminals to carry out their crimes online, because it’s easier to catch them in the virtual world than in the real one.

When a YouTube video came to its attention on Friday in San Francisco, the FBI had a Philadelphia man in custody the next day

[From How the FBI busted one YouTube nutjob in under a day]

It’s the same logic as with money laundering. If you raise high barriers by making people prove who they are before going online then they will either go to great lengths to avoid the rules (thereby enriching middlemen) or just avoid going online, in which case they cannot be tracked or traced at all. I wrote an article for SPEED (“Moving money and securities worldwide”) magazine’s Spring issue, noting that if criminals were to abandon suitcases full of 500 euro notes for platinum pieces in Everquest (frankly unlikely, but there you go) then surely it would be easier for law enforcement officers to masquerade as half-orc barbarians in Norrath than as criminals in the real world and therefore follow the money.

IS_A_PERSON

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[Dave Birch] I have explained before why, of the many credentials that might be associated with a digital identity as part of a commercial, sustainable business model, the IS_A_PERSON credential might be the trigger for the evolution of a more comprehensive infrastructure. Once again, a news story comes along to back me up.

The defendants, however, worked with computer programmers in Bulgaria to develop a technology that allowed a network of computers to impersonate individual visitors to online ticket vendors. The ticket vendors did not immediately recognize the purchases as computer-generated, so these “CAPTCHA Bots” let Wiseguy Tickets to flood ticket vendors as soon as tickets went on sale and purchase tickets faster than any human.

[From Four Indicted in CAPTCHA Hacks of Ticket Sites – Reviews by PC Magazine]

I’m in favour of making ticket agencies illegal and forcing all events to sell all tickets by auction on eBay, the appropriate market-clearing mechanism, but that’s a separate point. The problem that the services providers are wrestling with is that they don’t know whether they are dealing with a person or a bot, and that’s an important problem to solve in a wide range of applications. Commerce, games and even blogs have this problem.

If you have a blog where it is important that people, not bots, contribute then you might well demand to see a certificate with the IS_A_PERSON credential, even though you don’t actually care which person it is.

[From Digital Identity: Talkin’ bout my reputation]

An anonymous virtual identity with the credentials IS_A_PERSON and IS_OVER_18 would serve most people for most purposes most of the time, including buying tickets from Ticketmaster: Ticketmaster could cost-effectively and efficiently issue me with a Ticketmaster virtual identity with their own credentials once presented with my “real adult” identity and associated payment details.

Why virtual identities are real to some of us

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[Dave Birch] The real world is a horrible place, especially near where I live. No wonder that I prefer to sojourn in cyberspace. Is this because I am a geek, an outlier? No, it’s because I’m normal.

There’s a fairly strong argument that internet is, in fact, much, much better than the entire “real world”. It’s just easier being a human being there — not surprisingly, given that human beings invented it for human beings to be in; unlike the world, which we did not and are, let’s face it, still busking our way through.

[From Goodbye cruel world, I’m moving to the internet | Caitlin Moran – Times Online]

A few years ago, I wrote a couple of pieces that touched on this theme, including an article on “Opening a Branch in Narnia” for Financial World magazine after Alex Krotoski, Richard Bartle and I ran a seminar on virtual worlds for the CSFI. In this I noted that

One could imagine a flight to virtual communities, where mathematics (in the form of cryptography) provides a defence against crime and disorder that the metal barriers of a gated community cannot. If the community decides on a new law—no swearing in public places, let’s say—then they can enforce it instantly and 100% effectively by downloading a software update. If there are members of the community who don’t like it, they can go to another community instead.

[From Opening a Branch in Narnia An edited version of this article appeared in Financial World magazine, July 2006.]

Building on the Lessig-amplified “code is law” meme, I pointed out that whatever (in that case) Tony Blair might want for the country, he couldn’t just change a couple of parameters and reboot. The real world doesn’t work like that.

But the virtual one does.

I can see an article of some sort. Anyone called David?

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[Dave Birch] Well, my paper on “Psychic ID: A blueprint for a modern national identity” has been accepted for the new Springer journal “Identity in the Information Society” (IDIS). I didn’t completely understand the form I filled out, not being familiar with the world of academic journals, but I think the essence of it is that I can put a PDF of my original on my web site provided it contains a link to the actual journal article, so once I can sort that out I will do so. But the main reason for this post is just to note how what started off as an idea in a discussion — basically, trying to visualise 21st-century digital identity management using Dr. Who’s psychic paper as a reference point, having given up on trying to explain keys, certificates and all the rest of the crypto-infrastructure — became a presentation and then a paper and finally a peer-reviewed paper that I’m rather proud of. I’ve found a way to explain to non-technical audiences — well, British non-technical audiences at least — that the combination of widely-available devices and intelligence can deliver an identity management infrastructure that can achieve much more than they imagine.

Commercial activities

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[Dave Birch] Identity management technologies have to get into the consumer space and go with the grain of what companies and their customers want to do. Clearly we can’t just start from scratch and redesign all commercial interactions on top of a (currently non-existent) identity infrastructure. Yet the technology that we need to improve the customer-business interaction is coming together, so it would be a good idea to try and figure how it can be made useful or attractive.

The good news is that these problems are already being addressed. Technology now makes possible an identity infrastructure that simultaneously addresses the security and public service needs of government as well as those of private sector organisations and the privacy needs of individuals. Privacy-enhancing security technologies now exist that enable the secure sharing of identity-related information in a way that ensures privacy for all parties involved in the data flow.

[From IdentityBlog – Digital Identity, Privacy, and the Internet’s Missing Identity Layer]

The (albeit limited) marketplace concept of identity management as a way making logging in to web sites and filling out online forms less painful is there, so it would be a good place to start.

Business and identity cards

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[Dave Birch] We've decided to run a number of events linking the Digital Identity Forum to sister organisations with shared interests. The first of these will be joint seminar with EEMA at the British Computer Society in London on January 29th next year. This seminar, sponsored by Consult Hyperion, will be looking at the business opportunities that might arise from the introduction of the UK national identity card. You can register for the seminar at the EEMA web site. IPS will be presenting and we're hoping that all of their prime contractors will join an expert panel to share ideas on how British businesses can create new value around the scheme. We'll have an in-depth case study from Belgium to examine the business ecosystem that has grown up around the smart identity card introduced there. Look forward to seeing you there.

Gambling on ID security

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[Dave Birch] It’s been a landmark week for those of us fascinated by the UK’s national identity card scheme. The first cards have now actually been issued, so even as we speak identity fraud in the UK will be going… up. Why? Well, the government has met its own artificial target for the issuing of cards, but as you may have observed when you try to use one of the other smart cards in your possession (eg, your debit card), the cards are not the system.

Britain’s first ID cards cannot be read by any official body because the government has not issued a single scanner. Ministers promised to roll out hundreds of electronic readers of biometric details. However, a spokesman for the Home Office admitted last week that no employers, police forces, hospitals or colleges have been given the machine – and there are as yet no plans to issue them.

[From No scanners to read ID cards | Politics | The Observer]

So, in other words, as long as you can make something that looks like a plausible ID card, no problem. If you want to make it plausible, you need to go to the IPS web site to find out what physical features might be required to pass manual inspection. This will direct you to a helpful section on the UK Border Agency web site that describes those features in detail. it also explains how to verify a card that is presented to you…

Sponsors are expected to look at the card carefully. It will show the person’s entitlement to work, study or access public funds. The Guidance on identity cards for foreign nationals shows how you can check a card to ensure it is valid. This will help you to become familiar with its design and recognise the card when you are shown one. It also gives information on the card’s security features, to help you make your checks.

Although you are not legally required to check documents, we recommend that you do so for everyone you wish to employ.

[From UK Border Agency | Checking identity cards for foreign nationals]

The accompanying Guidance explains what a valid card should look like, but also includes some additional helpful steps for employers. These include

Physical checks can also be performed on the card. As it is made entirely from polycarbonate, it will have a distinctive sound when flicked, and the holder’s image will always be in grey-scale. The card should not be bent or folded, as this is likely to cause it to break. Contact with water should be avoided to prevent damage to the contact chip.

[From UK Border Agency | Checking identity cards for foreign nationals]

As far as I can see, life just got easier for illegal workers, since all they now have to do is to produce a valid-looking card and they are sorted. If you think that this is a hypothetical problem because no-one in the UK actually accepts these cards as proof of anything, think again.

UK casino operators can accept the Government’s new compulsory identity cards for foreign nationals as proof of ID – provided they meet money laundering regulation requirements, according to the Gambling Commission.

[From Identity Cards Now Welcome At UK Casinos | GamblingCompliance.com]

I’m sure the chance of an illegal immigrant using a forged card to launder money in a casino is so small as to be infestiminal, but nevertheless it does seem slightly odd to not even have plans to issue readers.

Cheering on ID cards

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[Dave Birch] One my favourite recent identity stories was the one about the woman who assumed her daughter’s identity to attend school so that she could fulfill her dream of graduating and being a cheerleader.

A 33-year-old woman stole her daughter’s identity to attend high school and join the cheerleading squad, according to a criminal complaint filed against the woman.

[From The Associated Press: Mom allegedly uses daughter’s ID to be cheerleader]

It’s a shame that there won’t be any more stories like this once ID cards are widespread. In the U.K., students are one of the target groups for the government’s launch of its national identity card, so no more 16-18 year old “getting served in pubs” or “masquerading as a cheerleader” high jinks for them. But hold on a minute. If this woman could fool the school well enough to obtain a false identity as her own daughter, then wouldn’t she be able to fool staff at the Identity & Passport Service (IPS) just as well? She’d sail through the rigorous interview (since she’d have no problem answering questions about her daughter’s date of birth and such like) and then get a biometric ID card: cheerleader dreams still on. It’s not as if it’s impossible to fool government employees who, after all, are just people like us (except with better pensions).

The Home Office admits that nearly 5,400 fraudulent passports were probably issued last year alone. For the previous year the figure was 10,000. The DVLA admits that “tens of thousands” of its licences are suspect. The Guardian has been told that there may be around 100,000 “duplicate” driving licences in the system and nearly as many fictitious passports.

[From Up to 200,000 ID documents may be false | Money | The Guardian]

I wonder if the government will have to bring forward some kind of DNA testing in order to establish family relationships or to rule out this kind of personation. That set me to wondering just how close the woman’s DNA would be to her daughter’s, and then I remembered reading about a new DNA service that opens up the possibility of finding out.

If you’ve ever wanted to know just exactly how much DNA you share with your ridiculously tall brother or doppelganger best friend, you’ll soon be able to find out. 23andMe, a personal genomics startup in Mountain View, CA, is about to unveil a new social-networking service that allows customers to compare their DNA. The company hopes that the new offering will encourage consumers to get DNA testing, potentially creating a novel research resource in the process.

[From Technology Review: Social Networking Hits the Genome]

I love the idea of social networking that includes sharing genetic information as well as fave pop bands (perhaps the power of the Internet will reveal a connection — sorry, I just don’t have a Robbie Williams gene), a sort of Facebook meets Dr. Moreau.

Opening for business

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[Dave Birch] Despite some criticism, OpenID continues to spread. I have a rather soft spot for OpenID, but it is fair to observe that not everyone is enthusiastic.

We won’t make much progress on information cards in the near future, however, because of wasted energy and attention devoted to a large distraction, the OpenID initiative. OpenID promotes “Single Sign-On”: with it, logging on to one OpenID Web site with one password will grant entrance during that session to all Web sites that accept OpenID credentials.

[From Digital Domain – Goodbye, Passwords. You Aren’t a Good Defense. – NYTimes.com]

OpenID is simple (to technical persons such as myself), which is one of the main reasons why it is spreading, but that simplicity also means that it doesn’t solve all of the problems.

OpenID provides Single Sign On to social networking sites and blogs. It means we can use a public personna across sites, and just log in once to use that persona. But OpenID doesn’t have the privacy characteristics that would make it suitable for government applications or casual web surfing. And it doesn’t have the security characteristics necessary for financial transactions or access to private data.

[From IdentityBlog – Digital Identity, Privacy, and the Internet’s Missing Identity Layer]

True. However, there are people working to combine OpenID with other technologies in fruitful ways.

Google also announced that it is looking to combine the OAuth and OpenID protocol so that a service can not only request a user’s identity through OpenID, but also “request access to information available via OAuth-enabled APIs such as Google Data APIs as well as standard data formats such as Portable Contacts and OpenSocial REST APIs.”

[From Google Adopts, Forks OpenID 1.0 – ZePy]

All of these pointers suggest to me that business strategies should be featuring OpenID as a near-future practical component rather than as a distant solution to a poorly-understood problem.

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