Tag: identity privacy technology consumer
More data hilarity
PA Consulting – which on Tuesday told ministers it had misplaced the unencrypted names, dates of birth and expected release dates of the inmates, as well as the addresses of 33,000 prolific criminals – has won £240m of government contracts since 2004, including one as the Home Office’s “development partner” to “work on the design, feasibility testing, business case and procurement elements of the identity cards programme”.
[From Consultants who lost data are working on ID cards – UK Politics, UK – The Independent]
Today, however, PA Consulting have vanished from the papers, having been swept away by the hilarious blunder by one of RBS’ suppliers, who sold a disk drive on eBay without erasing it first.
The computer hard drive was sold for a paltry £35 but the information on it was priceless, as it contained highly sensitive documentation on American Express, NatWest and Royal Bank of Scotland customers.
[From Customers’ bank data sold through eBay | News | TechRadar UK]
Now, while the newspaper anger is, to my mind, slightly misplaced — while RBS losing peoples’ personal details including mother’s maiden name is bad, what’s worse is that you can use personal details including mother’s maiden name to execute transactions because RBS (like many other banks) have no consistent two- or three- factor security across channels, so the paper should be angry at banks for not implementing digital identity rather than losing hard drives — it must at some level lead to even further erosion of trust in banks.
Technology lessons
While it makes a brief mention of credentials (r. 5), the report is extremely backward-looking on technology,
[From Blogzilla: Thomas/Walport data sharing review published]
The problem, I think, is more insidious than it seems at first. It isn’t just that the people writing the report don’t understand the technology, it’s that they don’t even appear to think that the technology is important. As I noted at the time of the review…
Pete Bramhall from HP sagely noted that the consultation document began with the statement that it assumed a familiarity with the Data Protection Act and other relevant legislation. How come, he pointed out, it did not assume a familiarity with rudimentary information technology, basic data security, elementary cryptography or, indeed, anything else that might help to develop a privacy-enhancing infrastructure for the modern world. Quite.
[From Digital Identity Forum: Another thing invented by lawyers]
How are we going to get a genuine breakthrough in identity management when the gap between the “two cultures” appears to be widening. No, not those two cultures but the cultures of information and communications technology one the one hand and lawyers (particularly the ones that end up in the government).
UK Confidential
Anyway, in the introduction, Charlie Edwards and Catherine Fieschi say that “We lack the language to discuss privacy holistically. We use outdated frames of reference that are no longer adequate to discuss the contemporary landscape of privacy concerns or re-frame complex issues about data protection and vulnerability in other terms”. I couldn’t agree more — I’ve been writing a magazine article arguing, similarly, that both the government and its critics on identity management share this outdated frame of reference (which I’ve labelled “Orwellian”) — and there’s no doubt that it is a major impediment, a contributing factor to the privacy logjam we’re now stuck in, where privacy and security are seen as opposites that we have to balance in some way. I don’t want to dip into the “what is privacy” discussion here, except to note that it is important not to make the mistake of conflating a brief period of essentially urban anonymity with privacy and therefore make privacy something we can return to or get back in some way: Most people, throughout most of history, have had no privacy whatsoever.
The essential core of privacy in a modern context, I think, must be built around choice and consent (this is why I’m looking forward to our participation in a couple of Technology Strategy Board projects on Privacy & Consent later in the year). I tend to see these as important components of future consumer propositions and therefore viable if chosen carefully — there’s no point coming with great privacy plans that business will never implement. They call the privacy component of an exchange an “invisible transaction”, which is nice way of putting it. If companies can find privacy-enhancing processes that go with the grain of business, then surely they will promote them (much as they have begun to promote “green” elements of their operations).
In the conclusion Charlie and Catherine say that “our collective ignorance means that we get the privacy we deserve” but I’m not sure I’d be so negative. People are ignorant about lots of things, but they expect professionals (eg, us, I hope) to make good decisions for them. I’m happy to contribute to that debate.
Meet the people
NFC, privacy and identity infrastructure
The attacks demonstrated are trivial due to the manufacturer time to market (TTM) obsession, thereby shipping devices with trivial vulnerabilities, in Mulliner’s research they orbit around passive tags which are mostly abused as vectors for the any of the attacks demonstrated.
[From Attacks on NFC mobile phones demonstrated | Zero Day | ZDNet.com]
The attacks fall, broadly, into two categories. There are attacks on the implementation of the NFC tag standard in a current handset — these remind us of a useful lesson about implementing new standards, but are not that significant in the long run — and attacks on the way that tags work in the current NFC standards. The problem that Colin has focussed on here is that there is no way of knowing whether a tag is "real" or not: you wave your phone at a Royal Bank of Scotland advert at the train station, but the tag has been tampered with (shielded by a bogus tag, for example) so that your phone is redirected to a web site in the Ukraine which looks like RBS but is just going to use your entered username/password to log in to your account for nefarious purposes. Unfortunately, that’s the way tags work: there is no way of preventing this and Colin is right to highlight both modifying original tags and replacing them with malicious tags as interesting security questions.
These questions relate to the better understood issue of product vs. provenance in the RFID world and, as we know, one way to solve that problem is by using digital identity: it’s just that it’s the identity of stuff in question, not the identity of people.
From paradise? No, Luton South
If you can’t prove how old you are, your days of shopping on the internet may be numbered. Fears that young people could be getting hold of knives, adult DVDs and alcohol are all fuelling a campaign by Margaret Moran, MP for Luton South, to make online age verification compulsory in the UK.
[From Online ID checks to limit teen booze and knife purchases | The Register]
I assumed that selling alcohol to someone under 18 was illegal whether you do it in a shop or on the web and so merchants would want to carry out age verification to avoid prosecution. As the reporter says, “Does anyone feel yet another justification for compulsory ID coming on?”
Fasten your seat belt
The economics of privacy is, like anything else, a matter of trade-offs… The problem is that people can’t make informed decisions if they don’t know exactly what the trade-offs are. And they’ve proven that they don’t.
[From Protect the Willfully Ignorant | Newsweek International Edition | Newsweek.com]
I couldn’t agree more. As it happens, Consult Hyperion is part of a consortium that has just been chosen by the U.K.’s Technology Strategy Board to carry out a research project in this field, trying to find better ways to describe and display privacy so that the consumers and citizens can make informed choices, can negotiate around privacy in a constructive way and can deal more effectively with both corporate and government organisations. The article goes on to make a comparison that I’m not sure is entirely valid: the comparison is between privacy and safety, and the reason I’m unsure about it is because it uses the example of cars, seat belts and accidents — all of which are things that consumers understand and can experience in a way that they cannot with privacy (at least, they cannot until our research project bears fruit!). Anyway, the article says
Car manufacturers let consumers pick engine sizes, color and the fabric on the seats, but not the design of the seat belt. “Consumers lack expertise about seat-belt design and don’t want to invest time learning about it,”… Rather than let people figure out the optimal seat belt for themselves, experts pick a standard.
[From Protect the Willfully Ignorant | Newsweek International Edition | Newsweek.com]
Ok, so let’s pick a standard. I vote for… er… hmmm… wait, I’ll get back to you on this.

